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Statement of Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction purusant to §§78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), 78-2-2(4) and
63-46b-16 Utah Code Ann. (1953).
Statement of Issues
1.

On a petition to reinstate Farmland Assessment Act ^greenbelt") status of

a |) | >H I e s' 1 • i ii < i, whether the a idence sustained the finding of no abandonment of agricultural
use of a small portion, the Bonanza Flat area, of the whole.
2.

If llir llonan/ii Flnt aiea w,ns not to hi intiiyirJ fiom the ^reenbelt despite

some reduction of agricultural use there, whether the evidence sustained a finding of
sufficient agricultural use of the entire property.
Standard of Review
The standard of review for both issues presented is the same. It is found in Section
59 1 61 0, I I" C "L (1953)(Supp. 1993). The Court applies a correction of error standard to
the Tax Commission's conclusions of law, and affirms its findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence

Insolai as appellant questions liir < 'ommi.ssioif >•. tliinliiij.'s ol l.icl,

appellant must marshall all evidence supporting such findings, then show that the findings
were not supported by substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 858
R2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993).
Determinative Statutory Provisions
Provisions in addition to those attached by appellant are attached hereto in Appendix
"C.
Statement of the Case
1

A. Nature of the case
This is an appeal of an Order, following rehearing, of the Tax Commission sustaining
the petition of appellees for re-valuation, and reinstatement of Farmland Assessment Act
("greenbelt") status, of lands in Wasatch County.
B/C. Course of proceedings/Disposition by the agency
The land in issue was accorded greenbelt status in 1985. In 1986-87, substantial parts
of the property were taken by eminent domain for Jordanelle Reservoir and related
improvements. In 1992, the greenbelt status of the property was canceled by Wasatch
County, the property was re-valued, and substantial additional taxes imposed, including a
rollback tax and penalties. Contemporaneously, the applicable statue, §59-2-503, U.C.A.
(1953), was amended: "agricultural use" sufficient for greenbelt treatment following 1992
required a showing of production equal to at least half the average annual production of
similar lands in the area, rather than the $1,000.00 annual agricultural income previously
required.
Appellees petitioned the Wasatch County Board of Equalization to reinstate the
greenbelt classification and amend the valuation. Despite the recommendation of the
Hearing Examiner that the property be reinstated (Appendix "A"), the petition was denied.
A similar petition to the Tax Commission was heard in February, 1995. The
Commission sustained the petition, ordering re-valuation of the property (as stipulated) and
reinstatement of greenbelt status. The order was re-affirmed upon petition for rehearing.
This appeal followed.
Appellant indicates that on this appeal it raises only the issues whether, applying a
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post 1992 test, appropriate agricultural use was maintained in a particular corner of one of
several tax parcels (the "South Mountains") of the property, and whether an alleged failure
to maintain appropriate use in this area disqualifies the entire property. This appears to
waive any claim that the whole property did not meet the $1,000.00 annual income test
applicable through 1992. It also appears to concede that the use of the bulk of the property
has been sufficient under the post-1992 standard, but to claim that if use has been curtailed
in an undefined portion of the "South Mountains", devices may be applied to work an
average insufficiency throughout the property. Since it relies upon an alleged failure of
agricultural use under the post-1992 standard, it waives any claim for rollback tax: "Land
that becomes ineligible for farmland assessment solely as a result of amendments to this
part is not subject to the roll back tax." §59-2-506(7), U.C.A. (1953)(Supp. 1993).
D. Statement of facts
The "Mayflower" property at issue in this matter, including what the County chooses
to call the "South Mountain property," is shown on the Wasatch County tax notices as
aggregating 3333 acres, but in fact aggregates 3420.5 acres. The latter figure was stipulated
by the parties, and included in the Tax Commission's Order as stipulated. The Stipulation
is Appendix "B" hereto.
The Gilmor family, which has leased the Mayflower property from various owners
for grazing for decades, owns additional acreage in the vicinity aggregating approximately
1600 acres, some of which is used for the same grazing operation, except for 40 acres which
produce crops and are not grazed. Testimony of Luke Gilmor at 68-69, 75.
The Mayflower property was first given greenbelt status in 1985, though it had been
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regularly grazed for many years previously. Testimony of Arie Bogerd at 55; Luke Gilmor
at 5-13. There appears to be no dispute that for 1992 and all prior and subsequent years,
the Mayflower property produced in excess of $1,000.00 annual agricultural income.
The southwesterly extension of the property includes slopes of Bald Mountain, which
rise to alpine meadows which include Bonanza Flat. Testimony of Gilmor at 22-23. Prior
to 1989, the Bonanza Flat area had been regularly grazed, the sheep and cattle being driven
up the mountain slopes, and the Gilmors maintaining a sheep camp in the area during
summers. Following 1989, grazing in the Bonanza Flats area has been reduced because the
area has been encroached upon by development from Park City. This has subjected the
area to unauthorized recreational use, and the predations of domestic dogs. Id. at 24-25.
While sheep and cattle still graze the slopes and canyons on the sides of Bald Mountain,
when they migrate into the upper meadows, the herdsmen return them to lower areas not
exposed to the dogs. The sheep camp in the upper area is no longer maintained, but the
land continues to be leased for grazing by the Gilmors, at a rent reduced to reflect reduced
useability, and help has been sought from the Wasatch County authorities to control the
dogs and trespassers in order to resume grazing at former levels. Id.
Appellant calls the area including the base and slopes of Bald Mountain and the
upper meadows near Bonanza Flat, all of which it calculates as 1495 acres, the "South
Mountains".
In 1992, the greenbelt status of the Mayflower property was canceled by Wasatch
County. In the same year, the governing statute was modified, to take effect in 1993, by redefining "agricultural use" sufficient to obtain greenbelt status. Prior to 1992, agricultural
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properties throughout the Stated had been assigned categories of value for agriculture.
Grazing lands were designated Graze I, to Graze IV. Testimony of Denny Lytle at 91-96;
Testimony of Glenn Burgener at 135-136. Though these categories had not previously been
used to calculate a level of agricultural use sufficient for greenbelt status, in 1992 the Tax
Commission staff proposed that, in future, they would be, by assigning a required use factor
("AUM requirement") to each acre of a particular category. Id. Wasatch County, like other
counties, therefore, sent notices to owners of greenbelted land advising them of the change,
and allowing them to, among other things, challenge the categories applied to their land if
inappropriate. Testimony of Glenn Burgener at 130-132, 150-151. Notices were not sent
to appellees for the Mayflower property, however, on the ground that it was being removed
from greenbelt, and they were thus neither informed of the changed standard or provided
opportunity to change their operation or to protest the categories of grazing suitability
applied to their land. Id. at 131.
The ground given by the County for cancellation of the greenbelt was the testimony
of a handful of County employees that they had observed that grazing on the land had
ceased. (Peculiarly, the greenbelt status of adjoining Gilmor land was not questioned,
though its agricultural use was the same grazing operation.) Before the County Board of
Equalization, appellees presented the continuing lease of their property for grazing, with the
affidavit of their lessee. Id. at 128-129. This satisfied the Hearing Examiner, but was then
rejected by the Board on the ground that they did not have the lease exhibits. Id. at 152153. The County did not then claim that agricultural use had fallen below a post-1992
standard involving grazing categories and "AUM's". Id. at 129-130. Appellees had no other
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way of knowing that such a standard was applicable, as it was not adopted by Commission
rule.
Upon cross-examination before the Tax Commission, the testimony of County
employees that grazing had ceased turned out to be based upon occasional chance
observations from cars passing on a new six lane high-speed freeway, or visits to nearby, but
different (not greenbelted) properties which did not provide views of the Mayflower
property. Id. at 306-313; Testimony of LeeRoy Farrell at 396-400. None of this testimony
concerned the Bonanza Flat area. The usual on-the-ground inventory by trained Tax
Commission personnel was not performed, and the expedient of calling the owners or the
family which had grazed the area for decades was overlooked. Testimony of Burgener at
313-321. The testimony of the County's employees regarding cessation of use appears not
to have been seriously credited by the Tax Commission.
Before the Tax Commission, the County relied chiefly upon William Giles, a federal
employee, whose job in connection with construction of Jordanelle Reservoir kept him in
the area of the Mayflower property. Testimony of Giles at 217-221. Mr. Giles testified that
he had not seen sizeable numbers of sheep or cattle on the property despite the fact that,
as a hunter, he had observed deer and elk on the property, using field glasses, in winter.
Id. at 230-236. By winter however, grazing has ceased for the year, and he did not use field
glasses during grazing seasons. (Compare testimony of Luke Gilmor, at 55-59.) Mr. Giles
agreed that the property was very large, with a very convoluted topography, and heavy
vegetation, and difficult to observe from the roads he used. Testimony of Giles at 252-257,
284.

Also, he had observed herds of sheep being driven toward or away from the
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Mayflower property from the adjoining Gilmor property, and he had on at least two
occasions been involved in complaints of cattle straying off the Mayflower property into the
adjoining federal property. Id. at 231-232, 238-242. On one occasion, his agency had paid
to settle a claim of poisoning a substantial number of sheep on the Mayflower property.
Testimony of Gilmor at 32-33. Mr. Giles* ultimate summary of his testimony was that he
would not say that the sheep and cattle were not on the Mayflower property, only that he
had not observed them. Testimony of Giles at 298-299.
Ultimately, it appears that the Tax Commission did not regard Mr. Giles' testimony
as inconsistent with that of the herdsman who testified regarding consistent grazing
throughout the entire period in issue.
In any case, the claim for which greenbelt status of the property was canceled - that
grazing had ceased - appears to have been abandoned. The present claim is that the grazing
which occurred, and which undoubtedly produced $1,000.00 annual income throughout, fell
below the post-1992 standard in one area; thus, the whole greenbelt should be canceled.
The herdsman, Luke Gilmor, testified that the property had been used for grazing
by his family for three generations, and continued to be used as it had in the past
Testimony of Gilmor at 5-11.

This use, following 1986, included annually grazing

approximately 1500 sheep for a period of four months, and 175 cattle for a period of three
months. Id. at 13-16, 28, 50-59. These figures fluctuated somewhat year to year, both as
to number of animals and length of time, depending upon conditions, but represent
reasonable averages. Operations had been modified to meet changing conditions, such as
the construction of federal and state improvements on part of the Mayflower land, and the
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encroachment of development in the Bonanza Flat area.
Mr. Gilmor pointed out that his family owned approximately 1600 acres in the area,
40 acres of which was used for crops, and the remainder for general grazing purposes. Id.
at 68-69, 75.
Based upon his 40+ years of experience in grazing on the very property, and other
properties nearby, Mr. Gilmor gave it as his unqualified opinion that historic and present
grazing use of the Mayflower property was substantially more than half the average use of
similar grazing properties in the area. Id at 39-40, 44-46, 77-80.
With respect to the Bonanza Flat area, Mr. Gilmor testified that it was a good
grazing area, and had been regularly grazed before 1989. The encroachment of recreational
trespassers and dogs, however, had necessitated curtailment of use thereafter. Id. at 22-24.
Sheep had not been driven into the area in recent years as they had in the past, though
sheep, and to a lesser extent cattle, had drifted there on their own. Id. While sheep and
cattle continued to use the mountain slopes and canyons, if they got into the upper
meadows, the herdsmen retrieved them to avoid predation by dogs.

Id. at 24-25.

Nevertheless, the area continued to be leased for grazing, because the animals continued
to use it, though at a reduced rent commensurate with its reduced use. Id. at 25-27. The
assistance of the Wasatch County authorities had been sought to control dogs and
trespassers in the hope of restoring the historic level of grazing. Id.
Denny Lytle, of the Commission staff, testified at the County's request that, under
a rule of thumb used by the Commission staff, but not adopted by Commission rule,
whether a grazing property was being used for half its agricultural capacity as required by
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the revised statute, was measured by calculating "AUM's" (animal unit months). Lytle at
121, 97-103. Under this rule of thumb, the agricultural capacity of land categorized Graze
II, such as the great majority of the Mayflower land, is .63 AUM per year per acre. To
calculate required AUM's, multiply animal units (1 cow = 1 unit; 5 sheep = 1 unit) grazed
by months grazed. If this figure is more than half the number of acres grazed multiplied
by .63, the land qualifies. Id. Assuming that the acreage grazed by Mr. Gilmor was 4714
acres, the required AUM's under the staff method were calculated by Mr. Lytle at 1485
(4714 times .63 divided by 2 = 1484.91). As the grazing operation described by Mr. Gilmor
produced 1725 AUM's (1500 sheep = 300 AU's times 4 = 1200 AUM's, plus 175 cows
times 3 = 525 AUM's; 1200 plus 525 = 1725 AUM's), according to Mr. Lytle, the use was
ample for greenbelt status. Id. at 100-106.
Mr. Lytle also testified that he could provide no foundation for the grazing categories
applied to the Mayflower land, as he had taken no part in assigning or reviewing them, and
could not vouch for their accuracy as measures of grazing capacity. Id. at 115-116, 198.
Glenn Burgener, the County Assessor, testified that the categories reflected value rather
than agricultural capacity. Testimony of Burgener at 135-136.
In fact, the acreage Mr. Lytle was asked by the County to assume, 4714 acres, was
not correct. 4714 acres was the County's artificial calculation of an area to which it claimed
all grazing was confined. Though confused initially, upon rehearing, the Commission
rejected this claim of the County, and utilized the correct acreage. The Mayflower land,
including the "South Mountains" area, was stipulated to be 3420.5 acres. Mr. Gilmor
testified to a further possible 1560 acres grazed, for a total maximum of 4980.5. The
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AUM's required by the staff for this acreage, applying Mr. Lytle's calculation, would be
1569, still substantially less than the 1725 AUM's Mr. Lytle calculated based on Mr.
Gilmor's testimony, and less than the 1590 which the County on this appeal claims was the
correct calculation based on Mr. Gilmor's testimony (Appellant's Brief at 46-47).
Summary of Argument
While a different rule may apply to land which has never been used for agriculture,
and is attempted to be attached to an agricultural parcel to obtain greenbelt, where land,
such as the Bonanza Flat area at issue here, has been used for agricultural purposes for
decades, and continues to be leased for agricultural purposes as part of a single agricultural
unit, but such use has been necessarily curtailed due to change of conditions beyond the
control of the owner, the question to be answered, for purposes of continuation of greenbelt
status, is whether agricultural use has been abandoned and replaced. §59-2-506 U.C.A.
(1953).

It does not show abandonment of agricultural use that intensity of use has

diminished as a result of conditions beyond the owner's control; nor is it required to show
continuation of full agricultural use as in the past in order to maintain greenbelt status.
It is conceded in this case that curtailment of agricultural use in the Bonanza Flat
area (not in the entire 1495 acres of "South Mountains" as alleged by appellant) has been
necessitated by a change of conditions beyond the control of the owners or their lessee. In
that case, the correct standard is not whether agricultural use is presently less than in the
past, or whether the curtailment of use has been prolonged, but whether the use that has
occurred is commensurate with the changed conditions, or whether there has been any
substitution of use or separation of the parcel from agricultural lands with which it had been
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used in common. The Tax Commission correctly found no abandonment of agricultural use
in this case.1
Otherwise, the owner of greenbelted property has no burden to show agricultural use
under a rule of thumb applied by the Tax Commission staff, but which the Commission has
not adopted as a rule. While such a showing might (or might not) be sufficient, it is not
necessary. The burden of the owners under the statute was to show agricultural use of their
property in excess of half the average use of similar properties nearby ("in excess of 50%
of the average agricultural production per acre for the given type of land and the given . .
area") and was carried in this case by the extensive testimony of their lessee regarding
historic and present grazing on the property, and his amply qualified opinion that more than
half the grazing capacity of the land had regularly been used.
The County provided nothing to rebut this evidence. It's evidence of non-use was
unconvincing. It failed to show that the property had any higher grazing capacity, and this
was not changed by the fact that there were assigned to the property grazing categories
which appellees had been denied the opportunity provided others to contest.

These

categories admittedly were affixed to establish a taxable value. The County provided no
foundation for assuming that the categories assigned appellee's land reflected, or were
intended to reflect, the capacity of the land for grazing. In any case, assuming that the
"Graze" categories assigned appellees' land were justifiable, and applying the staffs rule of
thumb for calculating "AUM's", the agricultural use of appellee's property was amply

The applicable statute, §59-2-506, omitted from Appendix A
of the County's brief, indicates that abandonment of agricultural
use occurs where land is "applied to a use other than agricultural
or is otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this part. . . "
11

sufficient for greenbelt status.
Argument
1.

The Tax Commission Correctly Concluded that Abandonment of Agricultural Use

was the Issue with Respect to the Bonanza Flats Sector of the Mayflower Property.
Generally, to show entitlement to greenbelt status, an owner must show agricultural
use commensurate with the agricultural capacity of the land. See Salt Lake County v. State
Tax Commission, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991). It is not necessary, however, to show
uniformity of use throughout or even that all included areas are regularly and profitably
used. Id. The statute must be accorded rational flexibility. Id.
Further, the showing necessary to establish greenbelt status, and that to maintain it
once established, do not appear to be identical. For greenbelt status to terminate, it must
appear that land previously in agricultural use is now "applied to a use other than
agricultural, or is otherwise withdrawn from the provision of this part." §59-2-506, U.C.A.
(1953). While the present statutory formula - "in excess of 50% of the average agricultural
production per acre for the given type of land and the given county or area" - is new and
untested, it would appear to be self-adjusting for local area conditions, such as drought, or
flood, or increased predation, which depress productivity.

The "average production"

standard does not appear to impose a rigid, unchanging qualification. The statute allows,
in fact, for wholesale waiver of the production requirement where failure to meet it is due
to no fault of the owner. §59-2-503(5), U.C.A. (1953). It would appear, therefore, that a
finding that land previously in greenbelt has been "applied to a use other than agricultural"
would have to be supported by facts other than that intensity of agricultural use in one area
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had declined due to natural conditions beyond the owner's control. This is in accord with
the "liberality" of construction traditionally accorded tax measures.

Parsons Asphalt

Products v. State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 357, 398 (Utah 1980).
Insofar as Wasatch County does not question that the migration of domestic dogs
into the Bonanza Flat area of appellee's property necessitates reduction of grazing, and that
the condition is beyond appellee's control (or, apparently, the control of the responsible
Wasatch County authorities) it is inappropriate for the County to argue laboriously that
appellees have failed to show appropriate agricultural use because present use is not
comparable to prior use. While the case might be different if the Bonanza Flats area had
never been grazed, and were simply tacked onto grazing lands to get favorable tax treatment
(Salt Lake County v. State Tax Commission, supra), a reduction in historic use
commensurate with changed conditions beyond the owner's control does not appear to
offend the Supreme Court's rule of "liberality and common sense". Id. at 779.
Further, it is inappropriate for the County to claim that, as the formerly regular
grazing in certain upper meadows has been curtailed, as the evidence showed in this case,
agricultural use has ceased in the entire 1485 acre tax parcel of which the meadows are a
small part, along with mountain slopes and canyons. The evidence showed that the slopes
and canyons continued to be used as in the past
The Tax Commission applied the appropriate rule. It held that "while it is clear that
there has been a reduced agricultural usage of a portion of the south main property which
occurred in either 1987 or 1989, the Commission cannot find that there has been a change
of use in the property." Order 8-25-95 at 15. The affected sector of the property continues
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to be leased with the larger agricultural unit of which it is part, and to be used for
agricultural purposes to the extent it can be. No other use has intervened. That is
sufficient to maintain the greenbelt status.
2. Appellees Were Not Required to make a Showing of "AUM's".
The County canceled appellees' greenbelt under the 1992 standard for agricultural
use, upon grounds which have been disproven, and which the County now abandons. Based
upon the improper cancellation, it denied appellants notice of the standard they would be
required to meet in future, and opportunity to meet it, or to contest its application to their
land. The County now complains that appellees failed to meet the new standard, if rigidly
applied, in one area, and that this justifies cancellation of the entire greenbelt, a roll back
tax, and penalties.
The County appears to have assumed that it was appellees' burden to show adequate
agricultural use of their land under the "AUM" rule of thumb. The Tax Commission may
also have so assumed.
In fact, appellees had no such responsibility.
Under Section 59-2-503, greenbelt treatment is authorized for land "actively devoted
to agricultural use," which "means that the land produces in excess of 50% of the average
agricultural production per acre for the given type of land and the given county or area."
The section also provides, however:
(b) For the purpose of determining production levels for a given
county or area and a given type of land the first applicable of the following
established authorities shall be used:
(i) production levels reported in the current publication
of the Utah Agricultural Statistics;
14

(ii) current crop budgets developed and published by
Utah State University; and
(iii) other acceptable standards of agricultural production
designated by the commission by rule adopted in accordance
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act
None of the statutory indices of "production levels" listed in subsection (b)(i), (ii) or (iii)
were available through the Tax Commission hearing in this matter. See Testimony of
Denny Lytle, at 120-121. The Commission staffs "AUM" methodology had not been
adopted by the Commission by rule. Id. at 121. Landowners whose greenbelt status was
attacked in this period were left to their own devices to show 50% of average agricultural
production.
Even had appellees had notice of, or opportunity to discover, the AUM method, they
were not required to make a showing of AUM's because that method had not been adopted
by the Tax Commission by rule. Indeed, had they attempted to do so, it might have been
claimed that the showing was inadequate, for the same reason.
As they were not apprised of the AUM method until near the time of the Tax
Commission hearing, appellees chose to proceed by showing the expert opinion of their
lessee. As it turned out, this was also the method adopted by many counties, which asked
lessees and owners to file "recertification applications" stating their opinions. Testimony of
Glenn Burgener, at 130-132 and Ex. 105; Testimony of Denny Lytle at 138. That method
was plainly permissible and adequate in the circumstances, and if such opinion was founded
on detailed evidence and extensive knowledge and experience, such as Mr. Gilmor's, plainly
carried appellees' burden with respect to agricultural use. Wasatch County did not perform
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a single investigation of properties for which "recertification applications" were received.
Testimony of Burgener at 132.
The function of the County's application of the AUM method in this case was to
rebut Mr. Gilmor's evidence. This means two things. First, the question on appeal is not
whether appellees demonstrated the correct number of AUM's produced by grazing on their
land; it is whether any number of required AUM's shown by appellant was persuasive that
Mr. Gilmor's view was wrong. Second, it was the County's burden to lay an appropriate
foundation for the application of an AUM requirement to appellee's greenbelt. As the
County plainly failed to lay an appropriate foundation, it failed to show any number of
required AUM's.
Appellant attempts to proceed by showing that AUM's required for appellees' land
exceeded AUM's produced by appellees' usage. It failed, however, to show AUM's
required.
Calculation of AUM's required (as distinguished from AUM's produced) applies two
central criteria. The first is a classification of the grazing (or other agricultural) capacity
of the land in issue. Grazing lands are categorized "Graze I" to "Graze IV11 in descending
quality. Testimony of Lytle at 91. The second is a number quantifying the comparative
capacity of lands in different categories. The quantifier for "Graze II" lands is .63 (which
compares to 1.14 for "Graze I" land, etc.). When the number of acres involved is multiplied
by the numerical quantifier, the result is the grazing capacity, half of which is the "AUM
requirement" Id. at 97-100. That is, 200 acres of Graze II land has an AUM requirement
of 63 (200 times .63 = 126 divided by 2 = 63).
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To calculate the annual AUM production of a piece of land, multiply the number of
animals grazed there ("animal units") during the year by the number of months grazed (to
get "animal unit months", "AUM's"). Id. at 97-100. Animals are weighted according to
forage consumption. One cow (with calf) is 1 unit Five sheep (with lambs) is one unit
Id. A parcel which grazes 100 cows for 4 months in a year, has an AUM production of 400.
This is adequate if half the product of the number of acres and the numerical quantifier for
that category of land is less than 400. Id. at 102-103.
Here, there was ample evidence of the number of animals, number of months, and
number of acres grazed. There was adequate foundation for calculating AUM production
for appellee's land. Foundation was lacking for calculating an AUM requirement
Appellant needed to show both a foundation for the grazing categories assigned to
appellees' land, and for the numerical quantifies derived for each such category. If, for
example, land is categorized Graze I, which, based on its actual grazing capacity, should
properly be categorized Graze III, the resulting calculations will be wholly unreliable.
Testimony of Lyttle at 115-116; 131-135. While a foundation for the numerical quantifiers
might consist of a statistical study of production of lands throughout the State (see
Testimony of Lytle at 117), a foundation for the grazing categories applied must consist of
particularized evidence of the land in question. Here, the County wholly failed to provide
any foundation for the grazing categories it used to perform AUM calculations for
appellees' land.
Here the evidence showed that grazing categories were affixed to appellees' land in
the distant past, for the apparent purpose of valuation. Testimony of Burgener at 135-36.
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That is, it appears to have been assumed that "Graze I" land would sell for more than
"Graze II" land, and this apparently assisted in setting taxable values. Id.
No one who participated in establishing the categories for appellees' land, however,
testified, and the witness who did testify had never reviewed the categories applied to
appellee's land, and could not give evidence of their accuracy or propriety. Testimony of
Lytle, at 173. He conceded, moreover, in response to questions from Commissioner
Pacheco and appellees, that wide variations in the topography, gradients and water supply
throughout appellees' property, suggested that its nearly uniform categorization as "Graze
II" over several thousand acres, might involve mistakes. Id. at 115-116.
Apparently, the County, and perhaps the Commission, thought this deficiency in the
proof cured by the fact that appellees had not contested the grazing categories applied to
their land before the County Board of Equalization, and, therefore, could not do so before
the Commission. See Testimony of Lytle at 116. A party may be bound by a jurisdictional
fact without more, if he has been provided appropriate opportunity to contest it and has
failed to do so.
The uncontested evidence here, however, is that appellees were denied the notice
and opportunity to contest the grazing categories for their land which was admittedly
provided all other owners of greenbelted land in Wasatch County.
When the statute defining agricultural use was amended, and the Commission staff
developed the AUM method, the counties sent notices to greenbelt owners of the change
in the law, which, if pursued would have shown that, in 1993 and thereafter, the grazing
categories appearing in greenbelt owners' tax notices would be determinative of calculations
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of agricultural use of their lands, for purposes of maintaining the greenbelt

Wasatch

County owners \ui• uiliMii1 1 1h.il U flu ) \h i1;!,' 'In1 < jlrj "firs then''>fnir npphr'* di
their land inappropriate in this context, they could contest them. Testimony of Burgener
at 150-151.

These notices were sent by Wasatch County

greenbelted after 1992. Id at 130-131. They were not sent to appellees (Id. at 131) because
the County had decided to terminate appellees' greenbelt in 1992. Id.
Whe

appellee's greenbelt, its announced reason for doing so

was that County employees had observed that grazing of appellee's land had ceased. NFo
claim was made that grazing i

w J slain hi < i I u s< • «i I n | n m pyd,< mg categories for

the land. Indeed, it was the County's position that such a standard had never come into
play for appellees' land. Having not received the notice provided others, appellees nun Id
not have discovered the existence of the AUM methodology, because, though they may be
presumed to have known of the amendment to the statute, that mentions only methods
a

Commission's rules in this regard disclosed nothing.
Appellees had no basis for contesting the grazing categories applied to their land

before the County Board nl I'IJIMIIAIIIMI

1 h\ iv VJ" IT ILII . Vi ,, r > •• "!i^ « in Mi, I f!f*\st

categories affected any pertinent issue. They proceeded by proffering the affidavit of their
lessee, and a copy of the lease, to show that the land continued
This satisfied the hearing examiner. While it did not satisfy the Board of Equalization, that
was not upon the ground that the grazing shown fell below a disclosed standard, but
the gi c HI in i lM ;t the Cc imty declined to accept the evidence that any grazing had occurred.
In short, while it may have been possible to contest the grazing categories before the

County Board, they were not in issue there. Appellees were denied any notice that the
significance of the grazing categories on their tax notices had changed fundamentally, and
in a way which should be contested. No one is to blame for that but the County. It cannot
take advantage of appellees' silence in the circumstances to estop appellees from pointing
out that there is no basis in the evidence here for assuming that the grazing categories
applied to appellee's land bear any relationship to its actual grazing capacity.
Appellees were not estopped to contest the foundation for the grazing categories
applied in this case. Appellant provided no foundation. Appellees' objection to application
of the AUM method was well taken. (See appellee's closing, Tr. 419-422.)
Had appellees chosen to show appropriate agricultural use by the AUM method
appellant would have been estopped to deny the grazing categories applied to appellants'
land. On the other hand, without foundation, such grazing categories were not a basis for
asserting an AUM requirement. The most the AUM calculation provided in this case could
do was to support appellee's position. That is, we know, as a result, that grazing on
appellees' land produces 1725 AUM's per year, and that if the County's grazing categories
are right, this is more than adequate. Nothing else can be shown by this method.
Finally, of course, the County's present quibbles about AUM's do not in any way
contest the Commission's finding that for 1992 and prior years grazing operations on the
Mayflower property (including the "South Mountains") produced in excess of $1,000.00
annual income.
3. It is Not Appropriate to Double Count the "South Mountains" in Determining an "AUM"
Requirement.
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For purposes of showing whether appellees made appropriate agricultural use of their
land, Wasat< In ( mini} J'Aul Mi I ill* < Il lln t 'nmmiv.mii <l ill I iln

1I,,MII

llnii^

ii.imrlv,

compute the "AUM's" resulting from the grazing testified to by Mr. Gilmor, and, compute
the "A I JM' s" that would -be required for a parcel of 4 / 1 4 acres of "Graze II" land.
The 4714 acre figure was the dimension calculated by the County for a "peanut"
shaped area where, the County claimed, all of the grazing had taken place. The
I oiiitniv-ioii i|iiilr

[)IIH|M IIII'I,

jv

iHp]iTtril llir < "oini(y\ rl,iims about all grazing taking place in

the "peanut" (Order 2-9-96 at 4-5), and the County does not attempt to revive them on this
appe<
however, affect the calculation of 1725 AUM's for the grazing done by Mr. Gilmor.
Following rejection of the "peanut1, to calculate an AUM requiremei

appellee

1

it would remain simply to define the proper number of acres for which appellees must show
appropriate use, to determine the required number of AUM's for such acreage, and to
nun p. in:" (a 1 i/?*;
The County claims that the correct number of acres is 4714 plus 1495 for the "South
Moui
requirement of 1956. Since, however, the Tax Commission on rehearing has determined
that the 4714 acre figure is meaningless, and then* is litei ally m i rviiiciiu nil

I.IIIIIII

, i i M II

alteration of use in most of the 1495 acres of the "South Mountains", this calculation cannot
be correct."
The County stipulated that the entire Mayflower property, including the "South
Mountains", is 3420.5 acres. The County now says that this was only for valuation purposes,
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not for calculating AUM's. If the County were right about that, it would be bound by the
acreage shown on its tax notices, which aggregates, for the entire property including the
South Mountains, 3333 acres. To that figure would be added the Gilmor family acreage
grazed, a maximum of 1560 acres. There is no evidence that any further acreage was
grazed, except to the extent that grazing animals were sometimes driven across intervening
parcels belonging to others, or strayed into them and were brought back. The appropriate
total is, therefore, 4980.5 or 4893, whether configured in the shape of a "peanut" or
something else.
With very minor exceptions, the Mayflower property is classified by the County
"Graze II". While the exceptions could be calculated separately, the result would be a
slightly lesser AUM requirement than results from treating the property as uniformly Graze
II. For simplicity the Tax Commission used an average of Graze II. Had a proper basis
been shown for the Graze II categorization, the requirement for 4980.5 acres is 1569 AUM's
(4980.5 times .63 divided by 2 = 1568.86), substantially less than the 1725 calculated for the
grazing which occurred, and less even than the 1590 AUM's which the County now argues
was correct (Appellant's Brief, p. 47) despite its own witness.
The calculation of AUM's now proposed by the County for 6209 acres effectively
double counts the entire acreage of the "South Mountains", and is obviously improper.
It does not appear improper, however, to argue that the present limitations on use
of the Bonanza Flat portion of the "South Mountains" lowers the grazing category for this
area. If it was properly Graze II, it is now nearer Graze IV, with a dramatic lowering of
the required AUM's.

In fact, it is only if you apply an inappropriately high AUM
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requirement

r

the "South Mountain" acres, and double count them, that any of the

( "<i "Hi II I y" s «f i i \\ in i 11 v in in I,"-., in 11 „ 11", mi" .; mi in in I I in in in in "' I i<" s<l ii se.
4 The Commission's Findings Are Adequate
I In "I 'muiiit) souglil idii'dini!' mi llliis m.illi'i ii[ 11 in I lln Im
' mid liul (M| nil inn • iillbjiiillnJ
by the County had mislead the Tax Commission into accepting an inappropriate calculation
or

MJs propounded by the County. Upon rehearing, the Commissi* n

County's presentation had been misleading, but that a con ect calculation of i\ I JM's
demonstrated that appellee's agricultural use was more than adequate. The Commission
Hi "i I" (HI i111 c" i "1 ni I I HI 'ill il

"lmi(i(ii>(« its rnlmp, T i n 1 < ' o m i t y n o w c o m p l a i n s t h a t t h e r e s u l t o f a l l t h i s

is that the Commission's findings are inadequate.
I
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to permit ready application of the law by the reviewing court. U.S. West Communications
v. Public Services Commission. 882 P.2d 14J, IIS (I \U\\\ l(w 11
The County had attempted to show that Mr, Gilmor's informal drawing of the
general area in which "most" of his grazing took place, despite his disavowal of accuracy, was
a

precise ai ea in \ vhich all grazing had occurred. The County

employed its own devices (see testimony of Don Wood) to calculate the specific acreage of

grazing done by Mr. Gilmor, as compared to a requirement for the 4714 acres allegedly
grazed

If the purpose of lliis w.i; mil I i iiuluir rniilusioii, mli lemmiis nbsciin

Mi

Commission in its initial Order apparently took the 4714 acre figure to be the 3420
Mayflower acreage, plus the Gilmor family acreage about which there had been evidence
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in I in I I

(grazing on some part of a 1600 acre tract, of which 40 acres was in crops).
When Mr. Lytle's calculation showed 1725 AUM's, more than the 1485 needed for
4714 acres, the County claimed that as Mr. Gilmor's description of the area most grazed
omitted (sensibly) part of the area the County calls the "South Mountains", the Commission
should conclude that the additional acreage of the "South Mountains" , 1495 acres, had
sustained no grazing, and should be added to the 4714 acre figure, to aggregate 6209 acres
with a requirement of 1956 AUM's.
Upon rehearing, the Commission quite properly rejected the County's deceptive
claim about a "peanut" shaped area of 4714 acres. While the order on rehearing does not
incorporate a specific re-calculation of AUM's, it is plain that the Commission adopted the
re-calculation presented by appellees. At that point, the Mayflower acreage grazed (3420.5)
was stipulated, the additional maximum Gilmor acreage grazed (1600 - 40 in crops = 1560)
was in evidence, and the method of calculation (acreage x .63/2 = AUM's) was agreed. The
Commission quite correctly observed that the 1725 AUM's calculated by the County's
witness was ample for the highest total acreage, assuming that it was properly categorized
Graze II, and might even have been adequate had the Commission accepted the County's
acreage claim, and had the County shown the grazing category of all of the acreage it
claimed.
The Commission's findings were plainly adequate to disclose the evidentiary basis of
the ruling, and to permit application of the law.
The County complains also that in finding an inadequate showing of additional acres
for which the County claims appellees were responsible to show AUM's, and the grazing
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category of such lands, the Commission placed an improper burden on the County. In fact,
the entire A U M calculation was properly the County's burden, since it was offei ed t ::»i ebi it
appellee's showing through Mr. Gilmor that their property had been grazed m o r e than half
the average for similar properties nearby.
Cei tainl) once • appellees 1 lad obtained from the Coi rnty' s witness a calculation of
1725 A U M ' s produced by grazing on appellees' land, against a maximum requirement of
l^f) 1 )

U II \<l i II mi I
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County to demonstrate its claim of grazing of a sufficient number of additional acres, < sufficient grazing category, as to produce sufficient additional required

<

the difference between 1725 and 1569. A showing that some additional acres belonging to
others might have been grazed inadvertently, was inadequate.
In fact, the Tax Commission could not have based a ruling against the greenbelt in
this case on any A U M calculation presented by the County, because the County failed to

only was its application different in this case than in all other cases of similarly situated
owners - because appellees were denied opportunity to contest the grazing categorization
of their land - but, lacking such a contest, there was no evidentiary basis for assuming that
the categories applied were correct Mr. Lytle could provide nothing to support them. T h e
method was wholly unreliable, and, upon appellees' objections, should have b e e n stricken.
5

Appellees A r e Not Subject to Penalties
i\'. affiniilttiiil MM1 nil liim "Sftiilli MmiiilMii*" l i n n n rased

appellees

penalized for failure to advise the County that it had. Even supposing, however, that some
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technical failure of agricultural use had occurred, it would not appear that appellees could
be subject to the penalty provided in §59-2-506, U.C.A. (1953).
That section speaks of land which is "applied to a use other than agriculture or is
otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this part." It does not appear that one who in
good faith believes he has continued agricultural use can be subject to the penalty, especially
where he is, at least initially, sustained in his belief by the Tax Commission.
Moreover, it is plain from Mr. Gilmor's testimony that he did notify the County
authorities that dogs in the Bonanza Flat area were forcing a reduction in grazing, when he
asked them, unsuccessfully, for help in coping with the problem. Though this must have
occurred in 1989 or earlier, it does not appear to have suggested to the County any failure
of agricultural use prior to 1992.
Finally, as the predicate of the County's claim of failure to notify them of cessation
of grazing is an alleged failure to meet the post-1992 AUM test, fundamental fairness would
seem to require that the landowner be given notice of the test he must meet, and
opportunity to meet it, before he can be required to announce a failure to meet the test.
Here the County claims that, having been denied notice of the appropriate test, and
opportunity to alter operations, or even the boundaries of the greenbelt, to meet the test,
appellees are to be penalized for failure to announce an alleged inability to meet the test.
Conclusions
It appears that the County has, appropriately, abandoned its claim of cessation of
agricultural use of the Mayflower properties. It attempts to rely instead upon a claim that,
under a rigidly applied staff rule of thumb, use has diminished sufficiently in one corner of
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the property as to justify wholesale cancellation of the greenbelt
In fact, there has been insufficient reduction of agricultural use to constitute change
of use, or to justify cancellation of any part of the greenbelt Otherwise, agricultural use
DI IIIIM* wliolc

|!m»[]fi1i, i' min(Imi 111,! in inir<|iMlr li»i pcnibfH under the AUM method, even

if it is assumed that the County has applied the correct grazing categories to the land.
Dated t h i s / / ^3a> nl Scplcinbn, ll)%

'

^")

E. Craig Smay
Attorney for j Stichting Mayflower
Recreational Fonds, and Stichting
Mayfldwer Mountain Fonds
/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct gppy of the foregoing "BRIEF OF
APPELLEES" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /V^tlay of September, 1996 to the
following:
Dan Matthews
Bill Thomas Peters
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State Stree, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John McCarrey
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-^
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WASi^rCH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

-*- *x . v.*. .*

JZXpKCD:

25 North Mali

BOARD OF C0UN1 V COMMISSIONERS
T. U\REN PROVOST

J. MORONI BESENDORFER, CHAIRMAN

PETE A. COLEMAN

September 14, 1993
MayFlower
%Dan Matta
331 Rio Grande St. Suite #308
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dear Appellai it,
RE: PROPERTY SERIAL NUMBER: OWC~00r 5- 0 012-C24, OWC-0010-0-013-024,
OWC-0028-0-024-024, OWC-0029-0-025-024, OWC-0029-1-025-024, OWC-0030-3025-024, OWC-0031-0-026-024, OWC-0131-4-026-024, OWC-0031-5-026-024,
OWC-0031-6-026-024, OWC-0040-0-033-024, OWC-0051-0-034-024, OWC-0052-0035-024, OWC-0053-0-036-024, OWC-0075-0-007-025, OWC-0103-0-018-025, OWC
0110-0-019-025, OWC-0151-0-030-025, OWC-0151-2-030-025, OWC-0153-1-031025, OWC-0196-0-012-033, OWC-0198-0-002-034, OWC-0199-0-003-034, OWC0201-0-004-034
After careful consideration, your pe tition, to the county Board o±
Equalization, requesting a reduction in the taxable valuation of the
property listed under the above serial number for the year of 1 993 wn*
denied.
For further consideration oi i the above property, you may appeal ^
the Utah State Tax commission through the respective County Auditor
within ten days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, of the date of this
letter. This can be accomplished by obtaining the appeal form TC-240
from the Auditor's office, filling it out in duplicate for each serial
number appealed, attaching all required information, and returning the
completed appeal forms to the auditor for processing*
The County
Auditor will then forward the completed appeal forms to the Utah State
Tax Commission and the appeal process will be set in motion.
Respectfully,
fCH COUNTY

OF EQUALIZATION

/tfVfrv*
J.^ffareni

feloner

\\^hrTl
Commissioner Pi

Besend^rfer,

(_j^rta^i^

Chairman

___

Col ema

Wffcfo

Commissioner T. LaRen Pirovost

CLERK AUDTTOR
EVERLY ERCANBRACX

RECORDER SURVEYOR

JOE DEAN HUBER

SHERIFF
MKE SPANOS

ASSESSOR

OJENCBURGENER

TREASURER

ATTORNEY

n

JUSTICE COURT JUDGE

WASATCH COUNTY - 1993 BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
RECORD OF FINAL DECISION AND AUTHORIZATION
Parcel Number
Adjusted Values

Mayflower

Appeal Number

Pre-Board
Market

j

Equalized
Market

59
Equalized
Taxable

Pie-Board
Taxable

Land"7?AA
Improvements
Total Value

0 !
0

0
DENIED

0
0

- i
o !
- I
o i

Explanation to Support Board's Final Decision

Appellant provides a lease agreement indicating that subject properties are under FAA.
Assessor has assessed a roll-back tax on these parcels with the exception of the East Park lots.
Appellant questions the increased value in the East Park lots but fails to produce evidence
to substantiate claim for reduction. The other agricultural values are challenged as well, and
appellant fails to present evidence to refute assessors values. The preponderence of the
evidence is in favor of the respondent, and therefore the burden of proof has not shifted.
Recommend denial on a value change on the subject properties. The appellant has shifted
the burden of proof indicating that the subject properties have a valid lease agreement
allowing the benefit of FAA status. Recommend that the rollback taxes be abated at this time.

Board Authorized Signature (or County Seal)

Ron Perry

Date Signed

August 23, 1993

APPENDIX "B"

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS, AND
STICHTING MAYFLOWER
MOUNTAIN FONDS,

STIPULATION

Petitioners,
v.
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF WASATCH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,

Appeal Nos. 93-1672 to 93-1695
and 93-1784 to 93-1811
Serial Nos. See attached
Tax Type: Property

Respondent,

The parties hereto, by and through their counsel of record,
stipulate

and

agree

that,

insofar

as

the

Commission

deems

appropriate to determine values for the subject properties for the
year 1993, it may use the tax serial numbers, acreage and lot
amounts,

and values

shown on Exhibit

"A" attached

hereto

and

incorporated herein by reference.
This Stipulation is executed in compromise of disputed claims
concerning the valuation and acreage size of petitioners' property,
It is intended to set valuation and acreage size for the 1993 tax
year only.

It is not intended, nor should it be interpreted as an

admission of either the petitioners or respondent concerning any
legal or factual issue.

This Stipulation and the valuation and

acreage size contained herein shall not be used as evidence in any
proceeding except an action to enforce its terms.
respondent

expressly

reserve

the righc

Petitioners and

to raise any

legal

or

factual issues with respect to valuation and acreage size in any

other proceeding.

The Commission's adoption of this stipulation

will not constitute approval of any legal or factual issue.
DATED THIS

/^'

da

Y

o f Ma

rch, 1995.

E. Craig Smay, Esq.
Attorney for Retitione

"Jose^li T. Dunbeck
Attorney for Respondent

VALUES PER ACRE/LOT, AND TOTAL VALUES AS OF 1/1/93
NORTH PROPERTY
0.71

acres

656.46

acres

$
$1,500.00

2.00

$984,690.00

EAST PARK LOTS
25 Lots

$12,000.00

1 Lot

$23,000.00

$

323,000.00

SOUTH MAIN WITHIN THE DENSITY DETERMINATION
1,268.23
$3,400.00
SOUTH MAIN WITHOUT THE DENSITY DETERMINATION

$4,311,982.00

1,390.11

$1,100.00

$1,529,121.00

105.00
1,495.11

$

$

TOTAL

900.00

£i

9 4 ,, 5 0 0 .. 0 0
, 6 2 3 ,, 6 2 1 ..00

£L

2 4 3 , 2 9 5 ..00

Tax S e r i a l Numbers

ACRES

NORTH PROPERTY
OWC-0027-5-024-024
OWC-0027-4-024-024

.32
.39
0.71

OWC-0075-0-027-025
OWC-0075-1-007-025
OWC-0005-0-012-024
OWC-0010-0-013-024
OWC-0010-4-013-024
OWC-0103-0-018-025
OWC-0103-1-018-025

234.71
4.00
108.00
287.75
4.00
16.00
2.00
656.46

.

SOUTH PROPERTY WITHIN DENSITY DETERMINATION
OWC-0052-0-035-024
OWC-0031-5-026-024
OWC-0031-4-026-024
OWC-0031-0-026-024
OWC-0031-6-026-024
OWC-0029-1-025-024
OWC-0029-0-025-024
OWC-0030-3-025-024
OWC-0030-1-025-024
OWC-0053-0-036-024
OWC-0028-0-024-024
OWC-0030-4-025-024
OWC-0153-1-031-025
OWC-0151-0-030-025
OWC-0151-2-030-025
OWC-0110-0-019-025

172.89
55.00
85.00
87.73
39.77
125.00
419.64
14.25
2.10
16.00
92.97
3.75
28.00
49.25
2.92
73.96
1268.23

51% OF 339.00

MOUNTAIN PROPERTY OUTSIDE DENSITY DETERMINATION
OWC-198-0-002-034
OWC-199-0-003-034
OWC-0201-0-004-034
OWC-0203-0-006-034
OWC-0202-0-005-034
OWC-0040-0-033-024
OWC-0051-0-034-024
OWC-0052-0-035-024
OWC-0196-0-012-033

226.00
315.00
165.00
65.00
6.00
275.00
237.00
166.11
40.00
1,495.11

49% of 339.00

Insert in Stipulation.
This Stipulation is executed in compromise of disputed claims
concerning the valuation and acreage size of petitioners' property.
It is intend to set valuation and acreage size for the 1993 tax
year only. It is not intended, nor should it be interpreted as an
admission of either the petitioners or respondent concerning any
legal or factual issue. This Stipulation and the valuation and
acreage size contained herein shall not be used as evidence in any
proceeding except an action to enforce its terms. Petitioners and
respondent expressly reserve the right to raise any legal or
factual issue with respect to valuation and acreage size in any
other proceeding. The Commission's adoption of this stipulation
will not constitute approval of any legal or factual issue.

APPENDIX "C

RoIIbacK tax — x c u « i v
Lien — Computation of tax — Procedure — Collection — Distribution [Effective January 1,
1993],
(1) If land which is or has been in agricultural use, and is or has beer
valued, assessed, and taxed under this part, is applied to a use other than
agricultural or is otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this part, it is
subject to an additional tax referred to as the "rollback tax," and the owner
shall within 180 days after the change in land use notify the county assessor
of the change in land use and pay the rollback tax
(2) Failure of the owner to notify the county assessor of a change in land
use within 180 days, and failure to pay rollback taxes imposed by this section
after notification by the assessor that rollback taxes are due, subjects the
owner to a penalty of 100% of the rollback tax due
(3) Upon receipt of the notice, the county assessor shall have the following
statement recorded by the county recorder "On (date) this land became subject to the rollback tax imposed by Section 59-2-50G "
(4) The rollback tax is a hen upon the land until paid and is due and
payable at the time of the change in use
(5) The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by
computing the difference between the tax paid while the land was valued
under this part and t h a t which vvould have been paid had the property not
been valued under this part The county treasurer shall collect the rollback
tax and certify to the county recorder that the rollback tax hen on the property has been satisfied
(6) (a) The assessment of the rollback tax imposed by Subsection (1) the
attachment of the hen for these taxes, and the right of the owner or other
interested party to review any judgment of the county board of equalization affecting the rollback tax shall be governed by the procedures provided for the assessment and taxation of real property not valued, assessed, or taxed under this part
(b) The rollback tax collected shall be paid into the county treasury and
paid by the treasurer to the various taxing units pro rata in accordance
with the levies for the current year
(7) Land t h a t becomes ineligible for farmland assessment solely as a result
of amendments to this part is not subject to the rollback tax Any other change
in land use or withdrawal of land from the provisions of this part, whether
voluntary or involuntary, subjects the land to the rollback tax
(8) Land which becomes exempt from taxation under Article XIII, Sec 2
Utah Constitution, is not considered withdrawn from this part if the land
continues to be used for agricultural purposes
History: C 1953, 59-5-91, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 6; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 3; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 108; 1987, ch.
74, § 1; 1992, ch. 235, § 4.
Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1993. —
Laws 1992, ch 235 amends this section, § 6 of
the act provides "This act takes effect for taxable years beginning on or after J a n u a r y 1,
1993 "
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective J a n u a r y 1, 1993, substituted
"180 days" for "90 days" in Subsection (1),
added Subsection (2), redesignating the follow
ing subsections accordingly, inserted "county"
in the first sentence in Subsection (5), subdi
vided Subsection (6) and substituted "or" for
"and" near the end of Subsection (6)(a), added
Subsections (7) and (8), and made stylistic
changes throughout

